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Abstract. We extend the separation kernel abstraction to represent the en-
forcement of the principle of least privilege. In addition to the inter-block flow 
control policy prescribed by the traditional separation kernel paradigm, we  
describe an orthogonal, finer-grained flow control policy by extending the pro-
tection of elements to subjects and resources, as well as blocks, within a parti-
tioned system. We show how least privilege applied to the actions of subjects 
provides enhanced protection for secure systems. 
Keywords: Assurance, Computer Security, Least Privilege, Separation Kernel. 
1   Introduction 
The Sisyphean purgatory of penetrate and patch to which users of commodity systems 
are currently subjected has lead to increasing recognition that platforms with assur-
ance of penetration resistance and non-bypassability are required for certain critical 
functions. This need for high assurance calls for a layered system architecture where 
enforcement mechanisms of the most critical policies themselves depend upon layers 
of no less assurance. For many high assurance systems currently being planned or 
developed, a general-purpose security kernel may provide more functionality than 
necessary, which has resulted in increased interest in the use of separation kernels to 
support real-time embedded systems and virtual machine monitors (VMM). Many of 
these separation kernels are minimized to have both static policies and static alloca-
tion of resources, such as is suitable for certain fixed-configuration or embedded envi-
ronments. 
Despite a resurgence of interest in the separation kernel approach, the principle of 
least privilege (PoLP) [19] is often overlooked in the design of traditional separation 
kernels due to the belief that a separation kernel should only be concerned with re-
source isolation.  A principal consequence of this omission is that problems relating to 
all-or-nothing security and over-privileged programs are left for application designers 
(and security evaluators) to resolve. For systems that must protect highly sensitive or 
highly valuable resources, formal verification of the ability of the system to enforce 
its security policy is required. Recent advances in the assurance requirements for high 
assurance systems [14] have included verification of the target system’s conformance 
to the principle of least privilege. To provide vendors and integrators with tools to 
formally describe least privilege in separation kernels, a least privilege separation 
model is presented.  
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1.1   A Least Privileged Separation Kernel 
In the context of a research project to build a high assurance separation kernel [10] we 
have extended the separation kernel abstraction so that the principle of least privilege 
can be examined at the model level and can be verified to be enforced by systems that 
conform to that model.  
The traditional separation kernel paradigm describes a security policy in which ac-
tivities in different blocks of a partitioned system are not visible to other blocks, ex-
cept perhaps for certain specified flows allowed between blocks. (Here, “block” is 
defined in the traditional mathematical sense as a member of the non-intersecting set 
of elements that comprise the partition 0). If information flow is described only at the 
block level, then everything in a block can flow to everything in another block. This 
is contrary to the principle of least privilege required in high assurance systems. The 
least privilege separation model builds on the traditional separation abstraction by 
extending the granularity of described elements to the subjects [9] and resources 
within the partition.  An orthogonal flow control policy can then be expressed relative 
to subjects and resources, thus providing all of the functionality and protection of the 
traditional separation kernel, combined with a high level of confidence that the effects 
of subjects’ activities may be minimized to their intended scope.   
In the sections that follow we will elaborate on the concept of separation kernels 
and the need for least privilege in such systems. In particular, the granularity of inter-
block flows will be discussed in terms of “subject” and “resource” abstractions. A 
formalization of the least privilege separation model is presented and several aspects 
of secure system design and verification are discussed with respect to the model. The 
last sections of the paper review related work, and summarize our results. 
2   Concepts 
2.1   The Separation Kernel 
The term separation kernel was introduced by Rushby, who originally proposed, in 
the context of a distributed system, that a separation kernel creates “within a single 
shared machine, an environment which supports the various components of the sys-
tem, and provides the communications channels between them, in such a way that 
individual components of the system cannot distinguish this shared environment from 
a physically distributed one” [18]. A separation kernel divides all resources under its 
control into blocks such that the actions of an active entity (i.e., a subject) in one 
block are isolated from (viz., cannot be detected by or communicated to) an active 
entity in another block, unless an explicit means for that communication has been 
established (e.g., via configuration data).  
A separation kernel achieves isolation of subjects in different blocks by virtualization 
of shared resources: each block encompasses a resource set that appears to be entirely its 
own. To achieve this objective for resources that can only be utilized by one subject at a 
time, such as the CPU, the ideal separation kernel must ensure that the temporal usage 
patterns of subjects from different blocks are not apparent to each other. Other resources, 
such as memory, may be accessed by different blocks simultaneously, while preserving 
idealized isolation, if the separation kernel ensures, for example, that blocks are allocated 
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different and non-interacting portions of the resource. Furthermore, kernel utilization of 
its own internal resources must also preserve the desired isolation properties. 
Separation kernels differ from virtual machine monitors, in that support for com-
munication between blocks is required in the former, whereas a functional replication 
of the hardware interface is required in the latter. Specific implementations may, 
however, provide both kinds of support. 
2.2   The Principle of Least Privilege 
Saltzer and Schroeder concluded that least privilege is one of the eight design princi-
ples that can reduce design flaws [19]. They defined least privilege by stating “every 
program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges 
necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can 
result from an accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential interactions 
among privileged programs to the minimum for correct operation, so that uninten-
tional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to occur.”  
A decade later, the U.S. Department of Defense included a similar definition of 
least privilege in the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [6]. 
Layering, modularity and information hiding are constructive techniques for least 
privilege that can be applied to the internal architecture of the underlying trusted 
foundation (e.g., separation kernel) to improve the system’s resistance to penetration. 
The kernel can also be configured to utilize protection mechanisms such as access 
control and fine-grained execution domains to limit the abilities of a subject so that it 
is constrained to perform only the tasks for which it is authorized.  
2.3   High Assurance Criteria and Least Privilege 
The TCSEC refers to the principle of Least Privilege in two different contexts: the 
internal structure of the “trusted computing base” (TCB), and the ability of the TCB 
to grant to subjects a minimal set of authorizations or privileges. Despite the lack of 
an explicit reference to the principle of least privilege, the Common Criteria (CC) [5] 
provides the groundwork for it in several ways. It defines assurance as “grounds for 
confidence that an entity meets its security objectives.” The CC explains that the cor-
rectness and effectiveness of the security functions are the primary factors for estab-
lishing the assurance that security objectives are met. A high assurance separation 
kernel must be proven to correctly implement the security functions defined in its 
specifications and effectively mitigate risks to a level commensurate with the value of 
the assets it protects. To complement the formal proof, a constructive analysis is used 
to demonstrate that the implementation maps to the specification. Thus, a focus on 
resource separation and the structured allotment of privileges affords simplicity to the 
separation kernel, and enables a high assurance analysis of the correctness of its im-
plementation. 
If a system cannot restrict individual users and programs to have only the access 
authorizations that they require to complete their functions, the accountability mecha-
nisms (e.g., audit) will likely be less able to accurately discern the cause of various 
actions. A securely deployed system must be capable of supporting least privilege, 
and must have been administratively configured such that any programs that might 
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execute will be accorded access to the minimal set of resources required to complete 
their jobs. To provide high assurance of policy enforcement, a system should be able 
to apply least privilege at the same granularity as the resource abstractions that it ex-
ports (e.g., individual files and processes).  
2.4   Practical Considerations 
In the commercial security community, the use of the principle of least privilege has 
taken on the primary meaning, over time, of placing limits on the set of simultaneous 
policy-exemption privileges that a single user or application program can hold, such 
as may be associated with a ‘root’ process on a UNIX system. The commercial use of 
“least privilege” is not concerned with internal TCB structure or with the limitation of 
normal file-access authorizations for non-privileged processes. Note however, that a 
separation kernel has no notion of policy-exemption privileges or of privileged proc-
esses -- if the SK does not provide individual authorizations to the resources available 
at its interface, it cannot be used provide least privilege protection in the application 
domain. It is also noted that commercial product vendors have long ignored the assur-
ance benefits of well-structured code. Thus, commercial product development experi-
ence and precedence in the area of PoLP is not germane to the construction of high 
robustness separation kernels, wherein both contexts of PoLP must be applied. 
In practice, a separation kernel providing strict isolation is of little value. Con-
trolled relaxation of strict separation allows applications to interact in useful ways, 
including participation in the enforcement of application-level policies. In the latter 
case, applications hosted on a separation kernel will need to be examined and evalu-
ated to ensure that the overall system security policies are enforced. A monolithic 
application that runs with the same set of privileges throughout all of its modules and 
processes is hard to evaluate.  In order to reason about the assurance properties of the 
system, the applications should be decomposed into components requiring varying 
levels of privilege. Such decomposition is more meaningful if the privilege bounda-
ries are enforced by the separation kernel, rather than relying on, for example, error-
prone ad hoc agreements between programmers or integrators. The principle of least 
privilege affords a greater degree of scrutiny to the evaluation of both the kernel and 
the application, resulting in a higher level of assurance that the overall system security 
objectives are met.  
To better understand the use of least privilege in a separation kernel, we now turn 
to a closer examination of isolation and flows in these systems. 
3   Inter-block Flows  
The first-order goal of a separation kernel is to provide absolute separation of the (ef-
fects of) activities occurring in different blocks. In practice, however, separation ker-
nels are often used to share hardware among kindred activities that have reason to 
communicate in some controllable fashion. Therefore, we include in the separation 
kernel a policy and mechanism for the controlled sharing of information between 
blocks. 
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The control of information flow between blocks can be expressed abstractly in an 
access matrix, as shown in the example of Table 1. This allows arbitrary sharing to be 
defined, establishing the inter-block flow policy to be enforced on the separation ker-
nel applications. 
Table 1. Block-to-Block Flow Matrix 
 Block A Block B Block C 
Block A RWX W - 
Block B - RWX W 
Block C - - RWX 
Notice that an inter-block flow policy in which the flow relationships partially or-
der the blocks, such as in Table 1, may be suitable for the enforcement by the separa-
tion kernel of a multilevel confidentiality or integrity policy if meaningful sensitivity 
labels are immutable attributes of the blocks.  Under the conditions that a static sepa-
ration kernel does not change the policy or resource allocation during execution, and 
that the policy is not changed while the separation kernel is shut down, the policy may 
be considered to be global and persistent, viz. non-discretionary.  In this example, 
information flows (represented by ⇒) form the following ordering:  Block A ⇒ 
Block B ⇒ Block C. An assignment of labels to these blocks in conjunction with the 
rules defined in Table 1 results in a recognizable multilevel security policy: 
Block A := Unclassified  
Block B := Secret  
Block C := Top Secret 
The block-to-block flow policy allows all of the information in a “source” block 
(e.g., Block A, above) to flow to every element of a “target” block (e.g., Block B, 
above).  Extending the Table 1 scenario, if block B is also allowed to write to block 
A, for example to implement a downgrade function with respect to the assigned la-
bels, then all of the code or program(s) in block B would need to be examined to en-
sure that their activities correspond to the intended downgrading semantics.  If this 
assurance of correct behavior cannot be provided, such a circular flow (A ⇒ B ⇒ A) 
would create, in effect, one large policy equivalence class consisting of all of the in-
formation in blocks A and B. 
To limit the effects of block-to-block flows, we next introduce the notion of con-
trolling how much information is to be allowed to flow between and within blocks. 
4   Least Privilege Flow Control 
The implementation of a separation kernel results in the creation of active entities 
(subjects) that execute under the control of the separation kernel and the virtualization 
of system resources exported at the kernel interface (see Figure 1). Historically, many 
security models have utilized the abstraction of an object [10]. Because objects have 
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been classified in various ways, we decided to avoid this nomenclature issue by sim-
ply modeling “resources.” Similarly, as the definition of “resources” includes the ab-
stractions that are exported by the separation kernel, “subjects” are defined to be a 
type of resource.  
Resources are defined as the totality of all hardware, firmware and software and 
data that are executed, utilized, created, protected or exported by the separation ker-
nel. Exported resources are those resources (including subjects) to which an explicit 
reference is possible via the separation kernel interface. That interface may include 
programming, administrative, and other interfaces. In contrast, internal resources are 
those resources for which no explicit reference is possible via the kernel interface.  
Various implementations of separation kernels have elected to describe the system 
only in terms of blocks without describing the active system entities that cause infor-
mation flow.  Since the concept of subjects [10] is a term of art – and for good reason 
– we will use it to describe the active entities exported by in the separation kernel.  
We have found the use of the subject abstraction to be indispensable for reasoning 
about security in secure systems. Without the subject abstraction, it may be difficult 
to understand, for example, which block in a partitioned system is the cause of a flow 
between blocks [1] (e.g., the flow could have been caused by the receiving block as a 
reader or by the sending block as a writer), which application programs within a block 
need to be trusted (e.g., evaluated with respect to the security policy), and how to 
minimally configure the programs and resources of such a system to achieve the prin-
ciple of least privilege. Just as when writing prose, if actions are described passively 
(i.e., not attributable to the subject of a sentence) the cause of the action can be am-
biguous. In addition, use of subjects permits construction of a resource-to-block allo-
cation that provides a minimal configuration for least privilege (see Section 4.3).  
Modeling of subjects within a partition also allows the representation and examina-
tion of more complex architectures such as multiple rings of execution, as well as 
multithreaded and multi-process approaches.  
Separation Kernel Security Functions








































Fig. 1. Example Separation Kernel Configuration 
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Figure 1 shows an example separation kernel system with three blocks, three sub-
jects, a set of other resources, and some designated flows. 
An allocation of subjects and other exported resources to blocks is illustrated in 
Table 2, i.e., a “tagging” of each subject and resource with its partition (per Figure 1). 
Of the resources described in this table, the first three are subjects and the remaining 
exported resources are passive. Every resource is allocated to one and only one block. 
Consequently, we can state that the blocks of the separation kernel constitute a parti-
tion (in the mathematical sense) where: R is the nonempty set of resources and B is a 
nonempty set of subsets of R such that each element of R belongs to exactly one of 
the elements of B. From elementary set theory, it is known that a partition, B, can be 
used to create an equivalence relation on R. Thus we may induce that the allocation of 
resources to partitions creates equivalence classes. 
Table 2. Resource to Block Allocation 
Resources  





A A B A A B B B C C 
The principle of least privilege requires that each subject be given only the privi-
leges required to do its particular task and no more.  The separation kernel can sup-
port this objective by assigning access rights appropriately to the subjects within the 
block.  Rules can be defined for accessing different resources within a block. Table 3 
illustrates how allocations to support the principle of least privilege are possible when 
the separation kernel supports per-subject and per-resource flow-control granularity: 
no subject is given more access than what is required to allow the desired flows (only 
the resources that are part of a flow are shown in this table). 
Table 3. Subject-to-Resource Flow Matrix 
Resources   





W - - - 
2 R





- - - - 
R
W W
Together, Tables 2 and 3 show abstract structures which allow only the flows illus-
trated in Figure 1.  It is clear that the corresponding Block-to-Block flow matrix in 
Table 1, by itself, would allow many more flows than those illustrated in Figure 1. 
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5   Applications of Least Privilege 
5.1   Kernel-Controlled Interference 
In practical MLS system policies, several cases arise in which the normal information 
flow rules are enhanced.  For example, (1) a high confidentiality user may need to 
downgrade a file and send it to a low confidentiality user, and (2) a high integrity user 
may need to read a low integrity executable file (viz., a program). In both cases, the 
system may allow the transfer if the file passes through an appropriate filter: in the 
former, the filter must ensure that the file does not include any high-confidentiality 
information; in the latter case, the filter must ensure that the file does not include any 
Trojan Horses. These system policies allow a “controlled” interference of the low 
sensitivity domain (sometimes called “intransitive noninterference” [18]). That is, a 
flow connecting two endpoint processes is prohibited except when going through an 
intermediate filter process. 
A typical implementation of these policies in separation kernel and security kernel 
architectures is to use a “trusted subject,” in which the filter process is assigned a se-
curity range that spans the confidentiality or integrity range of the endpoint processes. 
However, this solution has the drawback that the kernel allows the filter process to 
access all information in both domains. With a Least Privilege Separation Kernel, the 
kernel can be configured to restrict the interference to a specific subset of the infor-
mation in each domain, thereby requiring less trust in to be placed the filter process, 
as shown in Figure 2.  
   SKPP System
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Fig. 2. Kernel-based Strictly-Controlled Interference 
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5.2   Regraders 
Within a block, it may be necessary to perform certain transformations on information 
that change its security attributes. For example, a guard [3] performs information re-
view and downgrading functions; and a quality assurance manager transforms proto-
type code into production code by re-grading it in terms of reliability. For each of 
these transformations there may be several subjects within a block performing various 
aspects of the task at hand. The principle of least privilege requires that each of these 
subjects be given only the privileges required to do its particular task and no more.  
An example of the application of least privilege separation is that of a “downgrader,” 
(see Figure 3) for re-grading selected information from classified to unclassified. An ini-
tiator (UInit) process in A writes selected classified information to a classified holder 
buffer in Block A. An untrusted copier process moves the contents of the holder to the 
dirty-word search workspace in Block B. An untrusted dirty-word search process 
(UDWS) in B provides advisory confirmation that the information is “suitable” for 
downgrading and copies the information into the clean results buffer (note that this proc-
ess’s actions should be considered “advisory” since it is fully constrained by the manda-
tory policy enforcement mechanism). Then the trusted downgrader (TDG) program in C 
reads the information from the clean results buffer and writes it to an unclassified re-
ceiver buffer in D where it may be accessed by an unclassified end-point process (UEnd). 
As constrained by least privilege as encoded in the subject-to-resource flow matrix, the 
downgrader process in Block C cannot read from any resource other than the clean re-
sults and cannot write to any resource in D other than the receiver. 
This limits damage in the event of errors, for example in the downgrader, initiator 
or search processes, and contributes to a substantive argument that only the down-
grader program needs to be trusted with respect to the application-level multilevel 
policy (viz., depended on to write down only when appropriate), and thus requires 
security verification with respect to that policy. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Trusted Downgrader. Dark areas with white text are trusted. 
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6   Related Work 
6.1   Protection Profiles for Separation Kernels  
The Common Criteria security evaluation paradigm includes a document called a pro-
tection profile that specifies the security functionality and assurance for an entire class 
of IT products, as well as a document called a security target, which provides a simi-
lar specification for a specific IT product. The protection profile is evaluated for con-
sistency with the Common Criteria requirements for protection profiles; the security 
target is evaluated for consistency with the Common Criteria requirements for secu-
rity targets, as well as for consistency with an identified protection profile (if any); 
and finally the product is evaluated against the security target.  
A forthcoming high robustness protection profile for separation kernels [11]; [15] 
includes least privilege requirements regarding subjects as well as kernel-internal 
mechanisms. Several commercial efforts are underway to develop separation kernels 
to meet this profile, include those at Greenhills, and LinuxWorks [2]. 
6.2   Trusted Computing Exemplar Project 
Separation kernel technology is being applied in our Trusted Computing Exemplar 
project [7]. This ongoing effort is intended to produce a high assurance least privilege 
separation kernel.  The kernel will have a static runtime resource configuration and its 
security policy regarding access to resources will be based on process/resource access 
bindings, via offline configuration (e.g., via an access matrix, such as are shown in 
Figures 1, 2 and 4). The static nature of resource allotment will provide predictable 
processing behavior, as well as limit the covert channels based on shared resource 
utilization [10]; [9]; [13]. Simple process synchronization primitives will also be pro-
vided, that can be implemented to be demonstrably free of covert channels (Reed, 
1979). This kernel is also used as the security foundation for the SecureCore architec-
ture [7]. 
6.3   Type Enforcement Architectures 
Bobert and Kain [4] described a “type enforcement architecture” with the capability 
to provide least privilege at a fine granularity, a form of which is used in the SELinux 
project [12]. There are currently no high assurance instances of such systems today. 
7   Conclusions 
The separation kernel abstraction and the principle of least privilege are significant 
tools for the protection of critical system resources. In this paper, we described a fu-
sion of the separation abstraction with the least privilege principle. In addition to the 
inter-block flow control policy prescribed by the traditional separation kernels, this 
approach supports an orthogonal, finer-grained flow control policy by extending the 
granularity of protected elements to subjects and resources, as well as blocks, in a 
partitioned system. We showed how least privilege provides assurance that the effects 
of subjects’ activities may be minimized to their intended scope. 
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In summary, application of the principle of least privilege, resource separation and 
controlled sharing are synergistic security properties in a separation kernel.  Each 
subject is only given a minimum set of logically separated resources necessary to per-
form its assigned task, and the sharing of resources between subjects is rigorously 
controlled by the kernel. A separation kernel that correctly implements these proper-
ties can meet the objective to minimize and confine damage with a high level of as-
surance. 
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